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While the income disparity between widowed women and similarly aged married couples is well
documented, we know far less about widows’ wealth holdings and how they compare to those of other
households. Data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation are used to investigate the
amount and composition of wealth held by four different groups: continuously married women, women
who would soon be widowed, recent widows, and long-standing widows. The analyses reveal that about-
to-be-widowed women have fewer assets than intact couples. From the data on recent widows we infer a
decline in wealth holdings at the time of the husbands’ deaths. These wealth findings parallel what we
know about income changes that surround the death of a spouse. The estimates also show that, generally,
annuitizing wealth changes by very little the income flows and poverty risk among low-income widows.An Assessment of the Wealth Holdings of Recent Widows
INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that the incomes of widowed women have lagged behind their married
counterparts over the latter half of this century. A recent study found that in the early 1990s, recently
widowed women had needs-adjusted incomes that averaged only 68 percent of those of similarly aged
married couples (Holden and Zick, 1997). This decline in needs-adjusted income that is typically
experienced by women after their husbands’ deaths is somewhat puzzling in light of the rising labor force
participation rates of married women and the expansion of the insurance and pension industries during
the latter part of this century. Occasionally, it has been suggested that widows’ lower incomes may be
partially compensated for by higher wealth holdings, but very little is known about the wealth holdings of
widows.
The death of a spouse is an event that may precipitate a large decline in wealth because the
widow may need to liquidate assets to cover health care costs incurred prior to the death and/or burial
costs. In addition, if the individual who died willed assets to anyone other than his/her spouse, this too
could drain some wealth. Life insurance policies may partially or fully offset this decline in assets if the
insurance beneficiary is the spouse. The magnitude of the decline in wealth that is sparked by the death
of husbands is not well known.
In this paper, we use data from the 1990, 1991, and 1992 panels of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) to learn more about the amount and composition of traditional forms of
wealth held by four groups of women: women who remain married over the panel period, women who we
know from the panel data will become widowed but are still married when assets are measured, women
whose widowhood during the panel period has already been observed, and women who were already, but
relatively recently, widowed when first interviewed. Comparisons across these four groups provide
insights regarding the magnitude of any changes in wealth that occur when a husband dies and the2
potential for using this wealth to augment the income of newly widowed women who might otherwise
risk falling into poverty.
THE LITERATURE
The life-cycle model of saving and consumption suggests that wealth is accumulated, at least in
part, to smooth out consumption over the life cycle (Ando and Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani and
Brumberg, 1954).
1 Given typical age-earnings profiles, this implies that households will accumulate
wealth during the middle stages of the life cycle and liquidate wealth during the later years. Consistent
with this model, research based on cross-sectional data reveals that household wealth in the United States
typically increases during the middle years (ages 45 to 65 or 70) and declines thereafter (Levy and
Michel, 1991; Wolff, 1992).
Some insights about the wealth holdings of widows can be gleaned by reviewing the literature
that focuses on comparing the wealth holdings of elderly and nonelderly households. Descriptive
investigations of asset holdings reveal that there is considerable dispersion of wealth within the elderly
population (Hurd, 1990; Smith, 1997a, 1997b). For example, Smith (1997b) reports that the bottom 10
percent of individuals in the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) Survey have
less than 1 percent of the wealth of the median AHEAD respondent. Multivariate analyses suggest that
this variation in wealth holdings may be partially attributable to differences in income (Smith, 1995,
1997a; Wolff, 1992), education (Smith, 1995, 1997a), race/ethnicity (Smith, 1995, 1997a), health status
(Smith, 1995, 1997a), and marital status (Hurd and Wise, 1989; Smith, 1995).
Investigations that examine the role of widowhood and wealth explicitly have been limited to
three studies to date. Hurd and Wise (1989) use data from the 1969–1979 Retirement History Survey
(RHS) of heads of households who were born between 1905 and 1911 to examine wealth holdings before
and after widowhood. Their analyses reveal that the typical woman who moves from being married to3
widowed between the 1975 and 1977 interviews experienced about a 30 percent decline in household
wealth during that 2-year period. Yet they also note evidence of long-standing differences in wealth
holdings, suggesting that the drop in wealth may not generally be attributable to rising medical expenses
immediately prior to the death. Nor did they find any evidence that would support the hypothesis that the
wealth differences are a function of bequests to children.
Descriptive work by Radner (1993) uses data from respondents aged 65 and older in the 1984
SIPP to estimate differences in wealth holdings among the oldest old by gender and marital status. He
finds that older widowed women, on average, have a moderately lower net worth, fewer financial assets,
and a larger percentage of their assets tied up in housing than do similarly aged men or similarly aged
“other women” (i.e., married women, women living with others).
Finally, Smith (1995) uses data from the 1992 baseline interviews of men and women aged 51 to
61 in the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to assess the correlates of wealth in a multivariate
context. In his analysis, he finds that widows continue to have significantly lower wealth holdings than
their married or divorced counterparts even after controlling for current income, health status, education,
employment status, region of residence, financial time horizon, subjective life expectancy, and intentions
regarding bequests.
At this point, the evidence suggests that the wealth holdings of widows are typically lower than
those of similarly aged married couples. Estimates of the magnitude of the difference, however, appear to
vary depending on the data used and the analytic approach. All three of the analyses done to date make
use of samples containing age restrictions that may further affect the results. To gain a better
understanding of how the death of a spouse affects the wealth holdings of widows, we use data on a
sample of recent widows spanning a wide age range and compare their wealth holdings to otherwise
similar married couples.4
METHODS
The data for the current analyses come from the 1990, 1991, and 1992 SIPP panels. SIPP is the
only data set that allows us to examine wealth using a sample of widows who are representative of the
larger population of women who are widowed at various ages. SIPP also has the advantage of providing
detailed information on the components of wealth. We use all three panels to increase the number of
widows included in our analyses.
Each SIPP panel is a nationally representative sample of households whose members are
interviewed at 4-month intervals over an approximately 32-month period. At each interview, data are
collected on household composition and the incomes of each household member over the preceding 4
months. In addition, questions from special topical modules, including household wealth and its
composition, are asked in each interview.
Although income data (including income from assets) are gathered for each month, wealth values
are asked only once.
2 The wealth module is part of the wave 4 interview in the 1990 and 1992 panels and
the wave 7 interview in the 1991 panel. This creates a challenge in terms of identifying newly widowed
individuals across the panels relative to when the wealth questions are asked. We deal with this by
classifying widows into three groups: (1) women who are married when they enter the SIPP panel but
whose husbands die prior to the interviewing wave where the wealth questions are asked (the newly
widowed), (2) women who are married when they enter the SIPP panel and who are still married when
the wealth questions are asked, but who report that their spouse has died at some subsequent interview
(the about-to-be-widowed), and (3) women who enter the SIPP panel as widows and who report in the
marital history module that their spouse died at some point in the preceding 3 years (labeled wave 1
widows). As a point of comparison in our analyses, we also include a random one-quarter sample of
similarly aged married women who are married when they enter the SIPP panel and who remain married
throughout the 32-month period (labeled the always married). The only further restriction we place on5
the respondents in these four groups is that they be age 40 or older at the time that they enter SIPP. With
these restrictions in place, the analyses that follow contain 784 wave 1 widows, 293 about-to-be-
widowed women, 219 newly widowed women, and 3,398 continuously married women.
3
A second challenge of using SIPP arises from a relatively high percentage of missing data on
wealth in SIPP. In the sample we use, 42 percent of the households have missing data for one or more of
the asset categories used to construct total wealth. The high percentage of missing data on wealth
questions is not unique to SIPP, because respondents in many surveys are either reluctant to answer or do
not know the answer to questions about the dollar value of their wealth holdings. Panels like the HRS
combat this problem by using bracketed follow-up questions for those respondents who are unable to
give a dollar value at first. SIPP does not utilize bracketed follow-up questions. That is, when a
respondent indicates that s/he does not know the dollar value of a particular category of wealth that s/he
holds, there is no follow-up question that tries to get a possible dollar range (i.e., so-called bracketed
wealth questions that ask if the value is more or less than a specified amount). Recent research suggests
that such follow-up questions can help an investigator obtain more precise estimates of wealth holdings
for those respondents who initially do not give an answer (Smith, 1995, 1997a).
Despite the drawbacks of the wealth measures contained in SIPP, we elect to use SIPP in the
current analysis for three reasons. First, it is the only panel that can provide information on wealth (and
its components) for recent widows of all ages. Second, SIPP does employ a cross-sectional imputation
procedure to deal with missing data on total wealth and its components, and thus widows who initially
had missing wealth data are included in the current analyses. In the multivariate analyses, we include a
dummy variable to control for the impact of one or more imputations of specific asset components.
Finally, recent research on the general quality of SIPP wealth data concludes that, despite its limitations,
SIPP provides high-quality measures of wealth and its components for the overall population and various
subgroups (McNeil and Lamas, 1989; Curtin, Juster, and Morgan, 1989).6
A final challenge of the data is the much younger age of the married couples in our sample than
those who are widowed. We develop a weight for the purposes of this study that is applied to the (panel
weighted) continuously married women to make their age distribution equal to that of the (older)
widowed groups. Thus, any observed differences in wealth are net of differences that might be
attributable to age discrepancies across the groups.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents basic sociodemographic information on the women included in the current
analyses. The distribution across widowhood groups demonstrates the infrequency of events observed
during these longitudinal panels. Eleven percent of the sample are women who are married at the first
interview and become widowed during the panel. Slightly over half of these (6.2 percent of the sample)
are widowed by the time of the wealth module. These and the 17 percent of the sample who were
widowed within 3 years prior to the first interview have wealth measured as widows—but these
measurements are taken fairly soon after their husbands’ deaths. The remaining eventual widows are
observed while still married, as, of course, are the always married. For the eventual-widows sample,
whether we observe their wealth when widowed or married is a happenstance of the timing of the wealth
module, which is not related to other characteristics of the women. The typical woman included here is
white, is over age 60, has a high school education, is not employed, and has/had a spouse who was not
employed in the month prior to his death.
4
Table 2 contains information on the percentage of households holding various types of assets by
widowhood group. The married-couple households in this sample are more likely to own a home, money
market accounts, and certificates of deposit than were similarly aged households (of all types) in the early
1980s (see Levy and Michel, 1991, Table 5.7). Yet those who enter the panel widowed, or who become
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12 years of schooling 38.8
>12 years of schooling 25.4












aMeasured at the time of the asset module.
bPercentages calculated excluding the wave 1 widows.8
TABLE 2
Percentages of Households Holding Various Kinds of Assets
Money Certificates IRAs
Market of and/or
Group Homes Accounts Deposit Keoghs Stocks Bonds
Wave 1 widows 76.0 18.3 33.7 17.0 18.6 4.3
Newly widowed 84.1 21.8 30.2 18.3 21.6 5.6
About to be widowed 82.6 17.1 38.5 16.5 19.1 6.4
Always married 87.6 22.7 41.1 31.3 28.9 7.9
    Chi-square 71.0** 11.5** 23.1** 97.3** 47.4** 13.5**
** p < .019
traditional kinds of wealth compared to their married counterparts. This suggests that perhaps the
husbands in these widowed households bequeathed certain assets to individuals outside their immediate
families when they died. Or perhaps these households did not experience the growth in various asset
ownership rates over the past decade that continuously married households have enjoyed. In either case,
these differences in ownership are consistent with the long-term income differences between eventual
and wave 1 widows reported in Holden and Zick (1997).
While Table 2 shows who owns what type of wealth, Table 3 shows the extreme diversity in the
distribution of wealth holdings for each of the four groups of women. Three pieces of wealth information
are presented. The first measure sums all financial and property wealth holdings for the individual or
couple, the next measure subtracts all debt that diminishes the financial security provided by wealth, and
the final measure captures liquid wealth holdings only.
The top 10 percent of wave 1 widows have more than 350 times the assets held by the lowest
decile of wave 1 widows. The range for newly widowed women and those who are about to be widowed
is not as great. And the range is clearly the smallest for the (better off) always married, with the top 10
percent having only about 24 times more wealth than the lowest 10 percent. Wave 1 widows and the
newly widowed have the lowest median wealth reports, with approximately $44,000 less and $40,000
less, respectively, than the median wealth holdings of the continuously married. Thus, women who have
been recently widowed have both lower wealth holdings on average and greater within-group dispersion
of wealth than the continuously married.
Table 4 presents two measures of wealth—total wealth and financial wealth—distinguished by
age of widowhood and race. There are substantial differences in median total wealth and financial wealth
holdings by age and ethnicity within each widowed group. Older nonwhite women who are newly
widowed have the lowest average wealth holdings while younger white women who are always married
have the highest average wealth holdings. The dramatically lower wealth holdings of older nonwhite10
TABLE 3
Patterns of Wealth Holdings by Widowhood Group (in 1996 dollars) 
Total Wealth Net Worth Financial Wealth
Wave 1 widows
Mean $123,052 $108,199 $44,812
Standard deviation 152,998 155,278 94,832
10%ile 804 0 0
25%ile 21,145 8,753 325
50%ile 76,181 64,313 7,739
75%ile 154,808 143,116 47,970
90%ile 299,482 263,526 111,934
New widows
Mean 149,063 138,040 58,497
Standard deviation 176,552 176,084 115,149
10%ile 4,779 58 0
25%ile 31,011 18,724 1,073
50%ile 80,883 70,199 10,732
75%ile 179,793 161,427 55,267
90%ile 307,324 287,382 123,487
About to be widows
Mean 165,985 156,294 73,442
Standard deviation 232,550 229,439 175,017
10%ile 2,152 0 0
25%ile 41,105 33,565 531
50%ile 107,389  95,003 13,597
75%ile 184,568 170,935 64,072
90%ile 345,442 341,427 146,000
Always married
Mean 200,390 178,484 88,255
Standard deviation 229,507 222,496 170,432
10%ile 16,977 -19,664 113
25%ile 53,896 15,675 2,831
50%ile 120,569 85,576 21,464
75%ile 239,595 196,940 82,639
90%ile 412,823 360,202 183,94211
TABLE 4
Wealth Holdings by Age, Ethnicity, and Widowhood Group (in 1996 dollars)
            Total Wealth                       Financial Wealth         
Mean (SD) Median Mean (SD)  Median
Wave 1 widows <60
White $135,485 $89,068 $51,506 $12,522
(164,175) (102,651)
Nonwhite 66,389 33,482 10,924 275
(87,004) (30,775)
Wave 1 widows >60
White 132,841 79,372 52,547 14,160
(151,018) (100,130)
Nonwhite 55,709 28,440 8,743 257
(66,890) (19,994)
New widows <60
White 169,710 97,174 74,890 21,664
(195,913) (133,534)
Nonwhite 81,382 56,484 7,222 1,544
(73,503) (9,198)
New widows >60
White 126,317 60,350 30,988 6,231
(137,788) (51,336)




            Total Wealth                       Financial Wealth         
Mean (SD) Median Mean (SD)  Median
About to be widows <60
White 187,581 118,860 89,252 17,901
(263,633) (202,835)
Nonwhite 124,120 60,879 40,581 1,394
(12,174) (61,332)
About to be widows >60
White 103,997 96,924 26,616 7,749
(102,311) (54,439)
Nonwhite 53,657 22,538 4,946 0
(73,074) (11,477)
Always married <60
White 218,647 161,952 100,898 46,765
(362,846) (281,090)
Nonwhite 87,072 58,685 23,069 2,743
(183,753) (82,356)
Always married >60
White 198,704 122,772 80,261 21,561
(128,867) (88,945)
Nonwhite 133,064 62,300 36,785 3,756
(100,041) (41,938)13
women—regardless of group membership—is consistent with earlier work that made use of the HRS to
examine ethnic differences in wealth holdings (Smith, 1995, 1997a).
Although we age-weight the widowhood groups to achieve identical age distributions (at the first
interview), other factors may cause differences in wealth across these groups that from the bivariate
comparisons appear to be due to their widow status. In Table 5 we use a multivariate approach to control
for other characteristics that could affect wealth holdings. Regressions are estimated for all three wealth
variables detailed in Table 2: total wealth, net worth, and financial wealth. Initially, both main-effects
models and models that included interactions between widowhood group and age, education, and race
were estimated. F tests revealed that the more parsimonious main-effects models are preferred and thus
they are the ones presented in Table 5.
5
Although this multivariate analysis is done with cross-sectional data, we are able to capture some
of the longitudinal information inherent in a panel by examining asset holdings as a function of a
woman’s particular widowhood group membership. This is because the timing of the wealth module is
random within the period over which women in the sample are widowed, and we observe widows only in
the early months of widowhood.
6 The regression coefficients indicate that wave 1 widows have the
lowest wealth holdings. They are followed by the newly widowed women and the about-to-be-widowed
women, while the continuously married women hold the greatest wealth. There is evidence of some
interactions between age and group membership, with older widows in all of the groups having
significantly fewer assets than younger widows.
The estimates associated with group membership suggest that the widowhood event precipitates
a substantial decline in wealth (i.e., the large negative coefficient associated with being a new widow),
with little prospect for economic recovery (i.e., the estimated coefficient associated with being a wave 1
widow is negative, statistically significant, and larger than the coefficient associated with the newly
widowed dummy). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that some wealth is being bequeathed14
TABLE 5
Parameter Estimates of the OLS Regression Equations (t-ratios in parentheses)
                                Dependent Variables                                
Independent Variables Total Wealth Net Worth Financial Wealth
Intercept 255,882 207,860 116,429
(23.7**) (19.7**) (14.4**)
Woman’s Age (1= <60) 41,661 64,168 32,192
(4.6**) (7.2**) (4.7**)
Woman’s Race (1=nonwhite) -73,499 -75,739 -45,389
(-7.9**) (-8.4**) (-6.5**)
Woman Has < High School Educ (1=yes) -165,141 -145,106 -95,506
(-20.3**) (-18.2**) (-15.7**)
Woman Has High School Educ (1=yes) -109,296 -94,069 -67,443
(-14.1**) (-12.4**) (-11.6**)
Children < Age 18 in the Home (1=yes) -24,463 -43,290 -17,614
(-1.96*) (-3.5**) (-1.9)
Woman Working (1=yes) 12,891 4,521 10,296
(1.5) (0.5) (1.5)
Wave 1 Widow (1=yes) -64,104 -56,667 -35,711
(-7.7**) (-7.0**) (-5.7**)
New Widow (1=yes) -42,250 -33,169 -24,577
(-2.9**) (-2.3*) (-2.3*)






2 .14 .13 .09
F-statistic 71.7** 66.3** 44.0**
aThe imputation dummy takes on a value of 1 if one or more of the asset categories used to arrive at the
wealth measure in question was imputed. An alternative estimation scheme was done where the number
of imputed categories was entered instead of the dummy. This alternative formulation (available from the
authors upon request) did not change the coefficient estimates associated with the other independent
variables.
** p < .0115
to individuals outside the immediate household at the time of the husband’s death and that this loss of
wealth is not fully compensated for by the receipt of any life insurance benefits.
What is perhaps more unexpected is the finding that wealth holdings appear to be lower in
widowed households even prior to the death (i.e., the estimated coefficient associated with the about-to-
be-widowed dummy). However, this finding is consistent with the work of Hurd and Wise (1989), who
also observed relatively long-standing differences in wealth holdings between continuously married and
widowed groups in the RHS data.
The negative coefficients associated with the about-to-be-widowed group may be explained by
one or more underlying factors. It may be that husbands who are about to die are in poorer health than
their counterparts in the continuously married households.
7 Smith (1995, 1997a) finds that health status is
one of the strongest predictors of wealth holdings. Husbands in poorer health may have had lower
lifetime earnings, which would lead to both lower asset accumulation and earlier death. Husbands in
poorer health may also have larger health care expenses that their households meet by liquidating assets.
In addition, it may be that the husbands in the about-to-be-widowed households are older than the
husbands in the married-couple households (even though these regressions control for the woman’s age).
Older husbands are more likely to be at a stage in the life cycle where they are drawing down on assets
because they are retired or have reduced their market work. Singularly or in combination, these factors
may explain why the typical wealth holdings of the about-to-be-widowed households are lower than the
typical wealth holdings of the continuously married households.
Other control variables included in the regressions merit brief discussion. Across all equations,
we find that, holding other factors constant, white women and more highly educated women have higher
wealth holdings relative to nonwhite women and women with less education. These findings are
consistent with past multivariate analyses conducted by Smith (1995, 1997a) that have examined the
correlates of wealth among the elderly more generally. Smith argues that racial differences in wealth16
holdings are likely to be a function of many contributing factors, including the fact that minorities
typically have lower lifetime earnings, lower inheritances, poorer health, and/or may have different
bequest preferences than their otherwise comparable white counterparts.
Like race, the role of education in explaining wealth differences in later life also appears to be
multifaceted. Women with high levels of education have a large stock of human capital, meaning that
they are more likely to have had higher lifetime earnings, married men with higher lifetime earnings,
and/or enjoyed better health (which can translate into both their own higher earnings and the ability of
their husbands to earn more) than their otherwise comparable counterparts who have less education. In
addition, more highly educated women may have enjoyed a larger inheritance and/or may have a stronger
bequest preference than women with less education.
The next two tables estimate the effect of economic well-being if the annuity value of wealth
holdings are included in income. We estimate for each couple and widow what income would be
obtained if net worth or financial assets alone were annuitized—that is, paid out over the expected
lifetimes of the widows. Table 6 shows the mean annuity value under different interest rate assumptions.
Because SIPP provides monthly income, we present the monthly annuity income that could be generated
from assets. The greater comparability between always-married and about-to-be-widowed couples is
striking as is that between wave 1 widows and newly widowed women, with the last two groups holding
less wealth.
In Table 7, we estimate what difference would be made to economic well-being if the annuity
value of assets was added to income. Among wave 1 widows, for example, poverty would fall from the
17.8 percent estimated for the module month to 16.9 percent if financial assets were annuitized. But
poverty and near-poor rates would also fall for the always-married couples. Indeed, annuitized financial
wealth makes only a small difference in both the absolute and relative poverty rates across these groups.TABLE 6
Projected Mean Monthly Annuity Payments from Assets
a
(standard deviations in parentheses)
      Monthly Annuity Based on Financial Assets                  Monthly Annuity Based on Net Worth           
Group 3% Interest 5% Interest 7% Interest 3% Interest 5% Interest 7% Interest
Wave 1 widows 336 (847) 382 (937) 432 (1,034) 809 (1,305) 924 (1,447) 1,047 (1,601)
Newly widowed 390 (801) 449 (912) 512 (1,033) 922 (1,251) 1,063 (1,420) 1,214 (1,603)
About to be widowed 605 (1,702) 682 (1,877) 763 (2,062) 1,222 (2,200) 1,387 (2,427) 1,563 (2,668)
Always married 620 (1,213) 715 (1,387) 816 (1,574) 1,277 (1,583) 1,470 (1,802) 1,677 (2,040)
aComputed using the average age-specific life expectancy for a woman in 1990 (Bell, Wade, and Goss, 1992).18
TABLE 7
Projected Means for Monthly Income and Income/Needs
Augmented by Asset Annuity Payments and Percentage of Households in Poverty
a
Wave 1 Already About to Be Always
Widows Widowed Widowed Married
Income 2,046 1,849 2,912 3,323
(1,919) (1,596) (4,356) (2,559)
Income + financial asset 2,442 2,324 3,597 4,038
annuity payment
b (2,493) (2,238) (5,112) (3,317)
Income + net worth annuity 3,002 2,973 4,304 4,793
payment
b (2,855) (2,674) (5,447) (3,580)
Income/needs 2.67 2.64 3.41 3.82
(2.30) (2.12) (5.40) (2.82)
(Income + financial asset annuity 3.24 3.37 4.29 4.71
payment)/needs (3.23) (3.20) (6.40) (3.89)
(Income + net worth annuity 4.07 4.36 5.19 5.65
payment)/needs (3.88) (3.83) (6.86) (4.30)
% w/ income/needs < 1.0 17.8% 19.2% 8.1% 4.4%
% w/ income/needs < 1.25 25.7% 31.6% 14.5% 8.0%
% w/ (income + financial asset
annuity payment)/needs < 1.0 16.9% 17.3% 6.9% 3.9%
% w/ (income + financial asset
annuity payment)/needs < 1.25 23.9% 26.7% 12.5% 6.8%
% w/ (income + net worth annuity
payment)/needs < 1.0 12.0% 11.7% 5.7% 2.8%
% w/ (income + net worth annuity
payment)/needs < 1.25 17.3% 17.1% 7.5% 4.6%
aAll income figures are measured on a monthly basis at the time of the asset module.
bComputed using a 5% annual interest rate and the average age-specific life expectancy for a woman in
1990 (Bell, Wade, and Goss, 1992).19
Compared to the always-married couples, poverty rates remain four times higher for wave 1 widows and
already widowed women and almost twice as high for the about-to-be-widowed group.
To see how the addition of annuitized financial wealth changes the economic situation at the
extreme ends of the distributions, Table 8 presents the mean income-to-needs ratio and the income-to-
needs adjusted for annuitized financial wealth for those in the top 10 percent and those in the bottom 10
percent of the wealth holdings for each of the four groups. The figures presented in this table reveal that
the addition of annuitized financial wealth has almost no effect on the economic position of those at the
bottom of the wealth distribution while it raises the income-to-needs of those at the top of the wealth
distribution by more than 50 percent on average.
CONCLUSIONS
This research extends previous analyses of wealth holdings among the widowed in several ways.
It makes use of a descriptive, multivariate model to estimate the correlates of wealth so that we might be
more confident that the simple relationships we observe between widowhood status and wealth are not
spurious. In addition, the data used in the empirical work are drawn from recent national SIPP panels,
thus providing us with insights regarding what the composition of widows’ wealth looks like in the
1990s. Finally, the exercises done in the later part of the paper provide insights regarding the extent to
which wealth annuitization might be able to offset the decline in economic well-being typically
experienced by widowed women.
We draw three main conclusions from this descriptive examination of widows’ wealth holdings.
First, our analyses reaffirm the findings of others (e.g., Smith, 1995, 1997a) who have noted greater
wealth disparities among the elderly relative to the nonelderly. We find considerable variance in the
wealth holdings of widows, suggesting that this primarily elderly subgroup may be contributing
disproportionately to the variance in the wealth holdings of the more general elderly population.TABLE 8
Mean Income-to-Needs for the Lowest and Highest Deciles of the Wealth Distribution by Widowhood Group
                             Lowest Decile                                                          Highest Decile                           
(Income+Financial Asset (Income+ Financial Asset
Income/Needs Annuity Payment)/Needs Income/Needs Annuity Payment)/Needs
Wave 1 widows 1.03 1.03 5.47 8.39
Newly widowed 1.49 1.49 6.35 11.02
About to be widowed 1.32 1.32 6.09 9.82
Always married 1.93 1.95 6.86 10.5021
Moreover, our work suggests that a focus on income differences alone is likely to underestimate the true
economic disparity between the groups.
Second, from our cross-sectional analyses we are able to infer that the decrement in wealth
attributable to the death of a spouse happens over a period of time rather than only suddenly at the time
of the death. As is the case for income (Holden and Zick,1997; Zick and Smith, 1991), couples who are
about to experience widowhood have somewhat lower wealth holdings than do couples who remain
intact. We draw this conclusion from the difference in wealth between always-married couples (mean of
$200,390) and the about-to-be-widowed group (mean of $165,985). There appears to be a further decline
in wealth when husbands die. Evidence supporting this contention is drawn from the comparison of the
wealth of the about-to-be-widowed group (mean of $165,985) and the newly widowed group (mean of
$149,063). And, after the death, wealth continues to decline as can be seen by comparing the wealth
holdings of the newly widowed (mean of $149,063) with the wave 1 widows (mean of $123,052).
Finally, while income-to-needs rise and poverty rates fall somewhat when the annuity value of
wealth holdings is added to income, the gain is small and it does not alter the relative differences in
economic well-being measures across these groups. In their research on the selection of pension options,
Holden and Nicholson (1998) found that wealthier males were more likely to forgo current consumption
(in the form of higher pension benefits during their lifetimes) in order to insure their wives against the
negative economic consequences of widowhood. The current analyses are consistent with this finding.
That is, wealthier households appear to have taken steps to insure that upon the death of the husband,
there will be minimal decline in income (adjusted for needs) experienced by the surviving spouse.
Moreover, the annuitization of the wealth holdings in these households further strengthens their
economic position.
In contrast, widowed households with low levels of wealth also typically have low incomes
(adjusted for needs). As such, we cannot assume that the typical low-income widow could improve her22
economic position by annuitizing her wealth. In this respect, the findings of this study reinforce the
contention that public transfer programs (i.e., primarily Social Security survivor benefits) play a critical
role in insuring the economic well-being of low-income widows.23
1Hurd (1987) also explores the possibility that saving in the latter part of the life cycle is
motivated partially by the desire to leave a bequest to family or friends. He finds no empirical support for
the bequest hypothesis, however.
2At each interview respondents are asked if they hold certain forms of wealth. This device is used
to assure that income from all assets is reported; however the value of those assets is asked only in one
interview during the panel.
3We restricted wave 1 widows to those widowed within the past 3 years in order to provide a
comparable postwidowhood experience to the eventual widows for whom the maximum postwidowhood
period is 28 months. That is, because eventual widows must be married at the first interview, the longest
period of widowhood is for those widowed in the month immediately after the interview. Though the
wave 1 sample was widowed in an earlier calendar period, the period of widowhood events for the
combined wave 1 widow sample and eventual-widow sample is just under 6 years and represents a time
during which no major legislative or economic events occurred that would make the widowhood
experience substantially different for the two groups. On the other hand, the wave 1 widows’ assets are
observed later in their widowhood than are assets for the eventual widows whose husbands die after the
panel begins but before the asset topical module.
4In the case of the continuously married women, “the husband’s employment status in the month
prior to his death” is actually measured at a randomly selected month within the panel.
5The regressions that include the various interactions are available from the authors upon request.
6In cross-sectional studies that compare married and widowed women, no information is
generally available on the prewidowhood economic status of the widowed women, the duration of their
widowhood, or the risk of widowhood facing the married women. In these SIPP data we know who is
about to be widowed and who was just recently widowed.
Notes24
7Ideally, these regressions should control for the husband’s health status. Unfortunately, this
variable is not available in SIPP for those households where the husband was retired or where the
husband was deceased at the time of the first interview (i.e., the wave 1 widows) and thus we could not
include it among the regressors.25
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